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Basel III and Systemic Risk Regulation - What Way Forward?1
One of the most pressing questions in the aftermath of the ﬁnancial
crisis is how to deal with systemically important ﬁnancial institutions
(SIFIs). The purpose of this paper is to review the recent literature
on systemic risk and evaluate the regulation proposals in the Basel III
framework with respect to this literature. A number of shortcomings
in the current framework are analyzed and three measures for future
reform are proposed: counter-cyclical risk-weights, dynamic asset value
correlation multipliers, and enhanced transparency requirements for
SIFIs.
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I Introduction
The ﬁnancial crisis of 2007/2008 unveiled the shortcomings in the regulation of
systemic risk and exposed the moral hazard that is associated with systemically
important ﬁnancial institutions. Governments were forced to bail-out these large,
complex and highly interconnected ﬁnancial intermediaries as they feared the un-
forseeable consequences of their default. The G20 responded to the crisis with a
new framework for banking regulation, commonly referred to as Basel III.2 Basel
III increases the quality and quantity of banking capital, introduces two liquidity
and one leverage ratio. However, the question if Basel III can effectively regulate
systemic risk and resolve the moral hazard that is associated with systemically im-
portant ﬁnancial institutions remains. To answer this question, this paper reviews
the literature on systemic risk and evaluates the Basel III framework with respect
to this literature.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section two gives an overview
of the regulatory responses to the ﬁnancial crisis. Section three reviews the recent
literature on systemic risk. What forms of systemic risk exist and how it can be
1The author wishes to thank Christian Fahrholz, Markus Pasche, Sebastian Voll, and the members
of the Erfurt Seminar on monetary and ﬁnancial markets research for helpful discussions and
comments. Corresponding address: Co-Pierre Georg, co.georg@uni-jena.de
2Basel III comprises of a number of documents that the G20 leaders have agreed upon: The Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision (2010b), “Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more
resilient banks and banking systems”, The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010c), “Basel
III: International framework for liquidity risk measurement, standards and monitoring”, as well as the
earlier document from The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010a), “Report to the G20:
The Basel Committee’s response to the ﬁnancial crisis”. Downloaded from http://www.bis.org/
list/basel3/index.htm on 12/29/2010.
Page 2
Working Papers on Global Financial Markets No. 17
operationalized. Section four outlines some shortcomings of Basel III and proposes
a way forward with systemic risk regulation.
II The Regulatory Response to the Financial Crisis
In response to the ﬁnancial crisis, the The Basel Committee on Banking Supervi-
sion (2010a) has compiled a set of new global standards which is commonly referred
to as Basel III. These standards were recently endorsed by the largest industrialized
and developing countries at the G20 summit in Seoul. They will be implemented
starting with January 1, 2013 and fully established by January 1, 2019. Basel III
comprises changes in all three pillars of the former Basel II standards. The ﬁrst pil-
lar consists of minimum capital requirements, while the second pillar describes the
banking supervision process and the third pillar aims to enforce market discipline
through transparency of bank’s risks. Although Basel II was not fully implemented
by the time the ﬁnancial crisis struck, it was agreed upon by the G20 leaders that it
has to be reformed in order to cope with systemic risk as well.
II.1 Design and Main Features of Basel III
The cornerstone of Basel III are changes regarding the ﬁrst pillar of Basel II. The
aim is to reduce the probability of bank failures by improving banks’ loss absorp-
tion possibilities. Besides extensions in capital requirements, an additional non-risk
based leverage ratio and two liquidity ratios will be established in Basel III. Capital
is about to increase both quantitatively and qualitatively. After a transition period,
banks will be forced to hold 4.5% common equity instead of 2%. A stricter deﬁ-
nition of common equity augments its quality and higher risk weights for several
exposures intend to cover both on- and off-balance sheet risks.
The recent ﬁnancial crisis revealed how crucial the break down of the interbank
market is, as many banks faced difﬁculties to reﬁnance themselves. Therefore, liq-
uidity requirements are implemented to reduce insolvency problems arising from
contagion via the interbank market. Under Basel III, banks will have to meet two
liquidity ratios. Whereas the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) follows a short-term
approach, the net stable funding ratio (NSFR) addresses longer-term problems aris-
ing from illiquidity. Under the LCR banks will be required to hold a sufﬁcient
amount of liquid assets with a high quality to obviate short-term disruptions. The
NSFR will include the entire balance sheet to prevent structural longer-term prob-
lems arising from liquidity mismatches. Details concerning both ratios are not yet
speciﬁed.
The capital requirement under Basel II form a Tier 1 risk-based ratio which is de-
ﬁned as the ratio between a bank’s core equity, i.e. its common equity and certain
other ﬁnancial instruments qualifying for equity, and its risk weighted assets. In
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the run-up to the crisis, the information content of this measure has been lim-
ited. Banks circumvented the constraint and increased both on- and off-balance
sheet leverage levels but were able to report strong Tier 1 risk-based ratios at the
same time. As high leverage levels increase a bank’s probability of default, Basel III
implements an additional non-risk based leverage ratio thus limiting incentives to
circumvent capital requirements. Like the liquidity requirements, it is not agreed
upon a concrete ratio. The Committee suggests to start the transition period with
a minimum Tier 1 leverage ratio of 3%.
Beyond these increased requirements for banks, Basel III will improve the super-
visory guidance of regulatory authorities under Pillar 2. The authorities’ capacity
to act will increase to enhance their ability to manage different kinds of risks, like
liquidity, off-balance or concentration risks. Furthermore, conducting stress tests
aims to assist the detection of systemic risks.
Pillar 3 comprises standards for market disclosure which will be raised in order
to enhance transparency. On their websites, banks will have to report more de-
tails regarding their balance sheets like revealing the terms and conditions of all
instruments of their regulatory capital base and explaining which deductions were
applied. These requirements have to be fulﬁlled by the end of 2011.
Additionally, Basel III includes a macro prudential approach. The recent ﬁnancial
crisis has revealed that micro prudential regulation is insufﬁcient to respond to
systemic risks, as it focuses only on ﬁrm-speciﬁc risks. Macro prudential regulation
thus seeks to stabilize the ﬁnancial system by taking into account risks arising
from the interactions between ﬁnancial institutions. In order to prevent systemic
risks, Basel III stipulates two kinds of capital buffers. In good times, banks will
have to build up a capital conservation buffer of 2.5% so that the total common
equity requirement rises to 7%. In times of distress this buffer can be scaled down
to absorb losses. Depending on national circumstances, the authorities will be
authorized to raise an additional countercyclical buffer of 0 to 2.5% in order to
counteract excessive credit growth which might induce systemic risks.
II.2 Regulation of Systemically Important Financial Institutions
The cases of Lehman Brothers and AIG have highlighted how single ﬁnancial insti-
tutions might trigger contagion effects or a common shock in the ﬁnancial market
and thus affect not only the banking sector but the economy as a whole. Hence,
macro prudential regulation seeks to impose additional requirements on institu-
tions which are systemically important, thus reducing their default probability.
Potential tools for such additional requirements might be for instance capital sur-
charges, contingent capital or bail-in debt. At present, neither a deﬁnition of SIFIs
nor details regarding these potential tools are speciﬁed in detail. The deﬁnition
of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) of SIFIs is expected in
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the near future is announced to include both quantitative and qualitative indica-
tors. Moreover, the BCBS is currently conducting a survey to reveal how much
additional loss absorbency potential an SIFI needs and to analyze which impact
the different requirement tools might have on the ﬁnancial system. The survey is
expected to be published by mid-2011.
At their Seoul summit, the G20 (2010) outlined cornerstones of a framework to
reduce the moral hazard risks posed by SIFIs and addresses the too-big-to-fail prob-
lem. This framework was developed in Financial Stability Board (2010b). The
cornerstones of the framework are: (i) a resolution framework and other measures
to ensure that all ﬁnancial institutions can be resolved safely, quickly and without
destabilizing the ﬁnancial system and exposing the taxpayers to the risk of loss; (ii)
a requirement that SIFIs and initially in particular ﬁnancial institutions that are
globally systemic should have higher loss absorbency capacity to reﬂect the greater
risk that their failure poses to the global ﬁnancial system; (iii) more intensive super-
visory oversight; (iv) robust core ﬁnancial market infrastructure to reduce conta-
gion risk from individual failures; (v) other supplementary prudential and other re-
quirements as determined by the national authorities which may include, in some
circumstances, liquidity surcharges, tighter large exposure restrictions, levies and
structural measures. Special emphasis was put on globally systemically important
ﬁnancial institutions (G-SIFIs). The G20 agreed that they should be subject to
a sustained process of mandatory international recovery and resolution planning.
Furthermore, the G20 (2010) stress, that supervisors should have appropriate tools
and powers to identify systemic risks at an early stage.
The Financial Stability Board (2010a) outlines in more detail how the intensity and
effectiveness of SIFI supervision can be enhanced. The ﬁndings are summarized
in ten recommendations relating to the mandates and independence of supervisory
authorities; the ressources and supervisory powers necessary to fulﬁll the mandates,
as well as accounts of improved techniques of banking supervision; recommenda-
tions for group-wide and consolidated supervision which relates to the supervision
of a group of ﬁnancial institutions; recommendations for continous and compre-
hensive supervision; information-sharing of home and host countries of globally
active systemically important ﬁnancial institutions; measures of forward looking
macro-prudential surveillance; and the use of third party services by regulatory
bodies.
Going forward, the G20 plan to strengthen the regulation and supervision of hedge
funds, OTC derivatives and rating agencies. They asked the FSB to develop recom-
mendations to strengthen the regulation of the shadow banking system by mid
2011. Meanwhile, various G20 member countries launched national legislative re-
forms that also address systemically ﬁnancial institutions.
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II.3 National Legislative Reforms
The ﬁnancial crisis revealed the need for a reform of the ﬁnancial regulatory frame-
work. It became clear, that unregulated systemic risk can pose a major threat to
ﬁnancial stability and economic growth. However, most G20 countries do not yet
have a formal deﬁnition of systemic risk (see International Monetary Fund et al.
(2009)) and different countries have differing views on what systemic risk is, even
on a non-formal level. Despite this fundamental problem, a number of govern-
ments reacted to the public pressure that was caused by the bail-out of supposedly
systemically important ﬁnancial institutions and proposed changes to the national
regulatory frameworks. This paper thus gives an overview of the legislative reforms
and reform proposals in the United States, the Eurozone and the United Kingdom.
In the United States, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protec-
tion Act was signed into law on July 21, 2010. This act can be regarded as the
broadest set of regulatory reforms since the reforms in response to the Great De-
pression. In over 2300 pages the Act comprises more than 240 rules across several
federal agencies. Different aspects of the ﬁnancial system are approached such as
consumer protection, increasing transparency for derivatives or limits on propri-
etary trading and hedge funds. In order to address systemic risk the Dodd-Frank
Act establishes the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC). The main tasks
of the FSOC are identifying systemically important institutions and gaps in reg-
ulation, collecting information and monitoring the ﬁnancial services marketplace
in order to identify potential risks. Both, systemically important non-bank ﬁnan-
cial institutions, as well as bank holding companies with more than $50 billion in
assets are facing stricter regulation standards under the Dodd-Frank Act. These
can include increased capital and liquidity requirements, leverage and concentra-
tion limits or enhanced public disclosures revealing how the institution could be
resolved. Moreover, the FSOC possesses further tools like the ability to impose
the issuing of contingent capital on distressed institutions. In case an institution
is nevertheless in distress the Dodd-Frank Act provides the room for takeovers or
liquidations.
The main critique on the Dodd-Frank Act with respect to considering systemic
risk is that most of the details regarding stricter requirements are not constituted,
yet, except for the leverage limit, which should not exceed 15 to 1. Acharya et al.
(2010a) argues that marking institutions as systemically important enables these
institutions competitive advantages (see e.g. Akram and Christophesen (2010) for
an empirical veriﬁcation) and incentivizes them to conduct excessive risk taking.
The European Parliament has given its ﬁnal approval for a reform of the EU ﬁnan-
cial supervisory system on 22 September 20103. The new legislation establishes a
newly founded European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) which will be hosted at the
3The adapted resolutions can be found at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.
do?language=EN&type=TA&reference=20100922&secondRef=TOC.
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European Central Bank (ECB). It will be responsible for “macro-prudential over-
sight of the ﬁnancial system within the Community in order to prevent or mitigate
systemic risks, to avoid episodes of widespread ﬁnancial distress, contribute to a smooth
functioning of the Internal Market and ensure a sustainable contribution of the ﬁnan-
cial sector to economic growth”. The proposal by the European Commission further
establishes a European System of Financial Supervisors, consisting of a network of
ﬁnancial supervisors who will work closely with the newly created European Su-
pervisory Authorities (ESAs). The ESAs are created by the transformation of exist-
ing European supervisory committees into a European Banking Authority (EBA),
a European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), and a European Insurance
and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA). The ESRB is an entirely new Eu-
ropean body, but will not have any binding powers to impose measures on member
states or national authorities. It rather acts as a standard setter which inﬂuences the
action of policy makers. The ESRB will not be limited to macroprudential super-
vision of banks, but rather monitors all types of entities or markets. It can issue
warnings and recommendations that “may address any aspect of the ﬁnancial system
which may generate a systemic risk [...] An essential role of the ESRB is to identify risks
with a systemic dimension and prevent or mitigate their impact on the ﬁnancial system
within the EU”.
In July 2010 the Government of the United Kingdom issued a consultation doc-
ument on proposed changes to the UK regulatory framework. A more detailed
proposal is expected early in 2011. HM Treasury (2010) conﬁrms plans to replace
the Financial Services Authority by a tripartite system consisting of the Finan-
cial Policy Committee (FPC), the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) and the
Consumer Protection and Market Authority (CPMA) which all form subsidiaries
of the Bank of England. The FPC will be responsible for macroprudential regula-
tion by identifying systemic risks, deciding on macroprudential tools and recom-
mending to the other authorities in order to reduce imbalances and weaknesses of
the ﬁnancial system, and to report to Parliament and the public in order to increase
the action’s transparency. As potential tools, the document considers countercycli-
cal capital requirements, variable risk-weights, leverage limits, forward-looking loss
provisioning, collateral requirements, and quantitative credit controls and reserve
requirements. The focus of PRA will lie on the operational part of regulation and
supervision by effectively coordinating macroprudential with microprudential reg-
ulation. The CPMA will be responsible for consumer protection and promoting
conﬁdence in the ﬁnancial system. As information sharing among these authorities
is essential a close cooperation is considered in the design of the authorities.
III Systemic Risk
Systemic risk is a broadly deﬁned term that has changed considerably in the course
of the recent ﬁnancial crisis. Until then systemic risk was predominantly under-
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stood as the probability of contagion effects that cause cascades of defaults. The cri-
sis, however, revealed that systemic risk might also emerge from two other sources:
(i) a common shock, leading to a simultaneous default of several ﬁnancial institu-
tions at once; and (ii) informational spillovers where bad news about one bank
increase the reﬁnancing costs of all other banks.
A categorization of systemic risks is given by Bandt et al. (2009) who distinguish
between a broad and a narrow sense of systemic risk. In their classiﬁcation, conta-
gion effects on interbank markets pose a systemic risk in the narrow sense, whereas
systemic risk in the broad sense is characterised as a common shock to many in-
stitutions or markets. This distinction is followed by the Financial Stability Board
(FSB) who deﬁnes systemic risk as “a risk of disruption to ﬁnancial services that is (i)
caused by an impairment of all or parts of the ﬁnancial system and (ii) has the potential
to have serious negative consequences for the real economy” (see International Mone-
tary Fund et al. (2009), as well as the background paper Financial Stability Board
et al. (2009)). The ECB suggests that systemic risk can be described as the risk of
experiencing a strong systemic event that adversely affects a number of systemically
important intermediaries or markets (European Central Bank (2009)). The trigger
of the event could either be a shock from outside or from within the ﬁnancial sys-
tem. The systemic event is strong when the intermediaries concerned fail or when
the markets concerned become dysfunctional. Since all these different dimensions
of a systemic event interact with each other, it is clear that systemic risk is a highly
complex phenomenon.
III.1 Contagion
Contagion occurs due to direct linkages between ﬁnancial institutions. Probably
the most prominent example of these linkages is contagion via interbank markets.
The interbank market can be described as a ﬁnancial network consisting of a set of
nodes, i.e. banks or other ﬁnancial institutions like hedge funds or insurance com-
panies, and a set of edges which form the connection between these institutions.
An extensive review on the literature of ﬁnancial networks is given in Allen et al.
(2010). The interconnection in the interbank market can lead to an enhanced liq-
uidity allocation and increased risk sharing amongst the banks, as Allen and Gale
(2000) argue. At the same time, however, increased connectivity can also amplify
contagion effects.
Analyzing linkages in the form of overlapping claims, Allen and Gale (2000) ﬁnd
that contagion is more likely to occur if the network structure is incomplete, as
in comparison with complete networks it is only able to absorb smaller idiosyn-
cratic shocks. Gai and Kapadia (2008) support the result that higher connectivity in
the ﬁnancial system reduces the probability of contagion. However, they identify
that the consequences in case contagion nevertheless occurs are more severe as the
possibility increases that institutions might repeatedly be affected. Haldane (2009)
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argues that connectivity is a knife-edge property. Up to a certain point, ﬁnancial
networks and interbank linkages serve as a mutual insurance of the ﬁnancial system
and thus contribute to systemic stability. Beyond this point, the same interconnec-
tions might serve as a shock-ampliﬁer and thus increase systemic fragility.
The stabilizing function of an interbank market might, furthermore, be affected by
the structure of ﬁnancial markets. Iori et al. (2006) ﬁnd that contagion probability
is lower in case the interacting institutions are homogeneous, i.e. they are similar
their characteristics such as size or investment opportunities, as thus no institution
becomes signiﬁcant for either borrowing or lending. This result, however, is in
contrast with Georg and Poschmann (2010) and Georg (2010), who ﬁnd no signif-
icant evidence that the heterogeneity of the ﬁnancial system has a negative impact
on ﬁnancial stability. Haldane (2009) describes the ﬁnancial system in the built-
up of the crisis as being characterized by complexity and homogeneity and argues
why these two ingredients lead to fragility by resorting to literature on complex
systems and ecology. Further structural factors are analyzed by Nier et al. (2007)
who constitute that higher capitalization levels, lower interbank liabilities and a
less concentrated interbank market reduce the likelihood of direct contagion in the
interbank market.
Due to their high liquidity, interbank transactions are amongst the most vital con-
nections between banks and have thus received special attention in the literature.
Eisenberg and Noe (2001) develop a liabilities matrix for a general interbank system
and calculate the full impact of a bank default in the system using linear algebra.
A number of authors follow this work and apply it to different countries. Furﬁne
(1999) examines the likelihood that a failure of one bank would cause the subse-
quent collapse of a large number of other banks in the US using the Federal Re-
serve’s large-value transfer system Fedwire. Mistrulli (2007) uses actual interbank
exposure data from the Bank of Italy Supervisory Reports database to analyze the
risk of contagion in the Italian interbank market. Gabrieli (2010) analyzes the
functioning of the overnight unsecured euro money market using data on unse-
cured Euros-denominated loans executed through the e-MID platform. Gabrieli
ﬁnds that monetary policy implementation was affected by the crisis due to “A
heightened awareness of counterparty credit risk”. Cajueiro and Tabak (2007) analyze
the topology of the Brazilian interbank market by using methods from network
theory. Manna and Iazzetta (2009) analyze monthly data on deposit exchanged by
banks on the Italian interbank market from 1990 to 2008.
III.2 Common Shocks
Another source of systemic risk emerges from indirect linkages between banks in
the form of common shocks. If a number of banks hold identical or similar as-
sets, this correlation between their portfolios can give rise to a ﬁre-sale which is
typically associated with signiﬁcant losses for a large number of banks. Acharya
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and Yorulmazer (2008) point out how banks are incentivized to increase the cor-
relation between their investments and thus the risk of an endogenous common
shock in order to prevent costs arising from potential information spillovers. The
banks’ returns of the last period are signals according to which risk-adverse depos-
itors update priors about future returns. Compared with the situation in which
both banks’ signals are positive, depositors expect lower returns in the future if
one bank’s signal is negative and, hence, demand higher deposit rates in order to
compensate for potential failures. Accordingly, a bank with a positive signal is fac-
ing higher borrowing costs if the other bank sets a negative signal. This sets an
incentive for both banks to increase the correlation between their investments to
increase the probability of joint success (and joint failure).
Acharya (2009) analyzes how banks are incentivized to induce an endogenous com-
mon shock in order to avoid negative externalities arising from a bank failure. The
driving factor behind this behavior is that a default imposes both positive and neg-
ative effects on the surviving competitor. Negative effects arise as not all depositors
are furthermore able or willing to lend their money to a bank, so that the surviving
bank faces higher reﬁnancing costs. However, the failure also leads to a reduction
of monitoring and information costs by taking over staff and technology. Depend-
ing on which effect prevails the payoffs of the surviving bank’s shareholders either
increase or decrease in comparison to no bank failure. Accordingly, if the failure
generates negative externalities banks are incentivized to increase the correlation of
their portfolios ex ante and thus increase the probability of a joint failure.
Analyzing the impact of central bank activity in a network model with interbank
market Georg and Poschmann (2010) highlight that common shocks constitute a
larger threat on ﬁnancial stability than contagion effects. Empirical studies conﬁrm
that correlation in the ﬁnancial sector increased. De Nicolo and Kwast (2002) illus-
trate an increase in correlation between large and complex ﬁnancial organizations
during the 1990s, whereas Lehar (2005) ﬁnds that this development was more severe
for North American than for European banks.
III.3 Informational Spillovers
According to Acharya and Yorulmazer (2003), as well as Nier et al. (2008), infor-
mational spillovers are another form of systemic risk that have to be taken into
account. This effect is sometimes called informational contagion, but the name is
misleading, since it poses a systemic risk in the broad sense of Bandt et al. (2009).
The main idea of informational spillovers is that the insolvency of a bank can in-
crease the reﬁnancing costs of the surviving banks, since especially in times of crises
ﬁnancial markets exhibit a herding behaviour. Acharya and Yorulmazer (2003) de-
velop a model of bank herding behaviour based on a bank’s incentives to mimize
the information spillover from bad news about other banks. In their model, the
returns on a bank’s loans consist of a systematic component (i.e. the business cy-
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cle) and an idiosyncratic component. If there are bad news about a bank, these
news reveal information about an underlying common factor and thus impact on
all banks. The authors show that even the possibility of information contagion
can induce banks to herd with other banks. Herding behaviour in this model is
a simultaneous ex-ante decision of banks to undertake correlated investments and
gives thus rise to correlations amongst the bank’s portfolios. Bandt et al. (2009)
give an overview of literature on bank herding as a source of systemic risk.
The different forms of systemic risk are not independent of each other and a bank
default does not happen instantaneously. During the build-up of the default, the
bank will start deleveraging and selling assets. This may cause ﬁre-sales in certain
asset classes and exacerbates the bank’s problems. At the same time, rumors about
the bank and similar banks will spread in the markets, causing market participants
to tighten their liquidity provision. Since the ﬁrst bank already is struggling, this
tightened liquidity situation can lead to a default of this bank. This default then
triggers contagion effects and possible further defaults at banks who have issued
interbank loans to the ﬁrst bank. As the recent ﬁnancial crisis has shown, ﬁnancial
markets show a herding behaviour as described in Acharya and Yorulmazer (2003)
and are aware of it too. In a situation of high uncertainty about the fundamen-
tal and idiosyncratic risks in the ﬁnancial system, liquidity provision will dry up
and market volatility will increase. While one can distinguish the various forms
of systemic risk by their manifestation, it is impossible to separate them in real-
ity. Contagion effects and common shocks will inevitably trigger informational
contagion and vice versa. Therefore, informational contagion is a vivid source of
systemic risk and has to be taken into account into macroprudential regulation to
enhance ﬁnancial stability.
III.4 Operationalizing Systemic Risk
In order to derive meaningful policy measures for regulating systemic risk, it is nec-
essary for regulatory authorities to measure and operationalize systemic risks. It
was recently emphasized by e.g. Borio (2010) that the distinction between the time-
and cross-sectional dimensions of aggregate risk is critical. In the time-dimension
leading indicators of ﬁnancial distress are needed, while in the cross-sectional di-
mension a robust quantiﬁcation of the contribution of each institution to systemic
risk is necessary. There are various aproaches in the literature to achieve these
goals. The European Central Bank (2010) differentiates between four types of in-
dicators to measure systemic risk: (i) coincident indicators of ﬁnancial stability
measure the current state of instability in the ﬁnancial system; (ii) early-warning
signal models to detect the build-up of systemic crises; (iii) macro stress-tests can as-
sess the resilience of the ﬁnancial system to aggregate macro-shocks; (iv) contagion
and spillover models are used to analyze the impact of a crisis on the stability of the
ﬁnancial system. By using a set of such indicators, central banks and regulatory au-
thorities try to assess the different dimensions of systemic risk. It is a precondition
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for a useful measurement concept of systemic risk that it takes all dimensions of
systemic risks into account and will thus be a combination of at least some of the
systemic risk indicators. The main problem to date is, that there does not exist a
reliable indicator to measure the informational contagion of a ﬁancial institution’s
default. This leads to a signiﬁcant element of uncertainty when assessing systemic
risks.
Systemic Importance of Individual Financial Institutions. A number of ap-
proaches assess the systemic importance of individual ﬁnancial institutions. Their
common goal is to impose additional regulatory requirements and oversight in ac-
cordance with the individual systemic importance of a ﬁnancial institution. Zhou
(2009) considers three different measures of systemic importance of interconnected
ﬁnancial institutions and correlates them with the size of the institution. The au-
thor ﬁnds that there is not always a relationship between the systemic importance
of a ﬁnancial institute and its size. The “too-big-to-fail” argument does not always
hold true and thus alternative measures of systemic importance have to be con-
sidered. The paper follows Segoviano Basurto and Goodhart (2009) and deﬁnes
a systemic importance index that resorts to multivariate Extreme Value Theory.
Another approach stems from cooperative game theory. Tarashev et al. (2009) use
the Shapley value to attribute each individual institution’s contribution to overall
systemic risk. They apply their methodology to a sample of 20 large internation-
ally active ﬁnancial institutions and derive their contribution to overall systemic
risk as a function of the institution’s size, probability of default and exposure to a
common factor.
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009) introduce CoVaR which is the Value at Risk of
the ﬁnancial system conditional on an individual institution being under stress.
The methodology thus focuses on how much an individual institution contributes
to overall systemic risk. International Monetary Fund (2009) uses CoVaR to assess
systemic risk in the US banking sector using CDS spreads. Fong et al. (2009) ap-
plies CoVaR to the Hong Kong ﬁnancial system. Arias et al. (2010) apply CoVaR to
the Colombian banking system analysing the systemic market risk contributions
of banks, pension funds, and between different types of ﬁnancial institutions. A
comparison of different sets of systemic risk measures is performed by Rodríguez-
Moreno and Peña Sánchez de Rivera (2010). The authors argue that simple indica-
tors are better suited for analysing systemic risk and ﬁnd that the best indicators
are the ﬁrst Principal Component of the single-name CDSs and the LIBOR-OIS
or LIBOR-TBILL spreads, respectively. According to Rodríguez-Moreno and Peña
Sánchez de Rivera (2010), the least reliable indicators are the Co-Risk measures and
the systemic spreads extracted from the CDO indexes and their tranches.
Huang et al. (2009b) propose a framework for measuring and stress testing the sys-
temic risk of a group of major ﬁnancial institutions. They construct an hypothet-
ical insurance premium against systemic risk, called the distress insurance premium
(DIP). The DIP is based on on ex ante measures of default probabilities of indi-
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vidual banks and forecasted asset return correlations. In order to construct the
proability of default of individual banks and asset return correlations are calculated
from CDS spread data. Huang et al. (2009b) applys the DIP to 12 major U.S. banks
during a sample period 2001-08 and are able to show a substantial increase in the
indicator after the onset of the subprime crisis. Huang et al. (2009a) furthermore
applys the DIP methodology to twenty-two major banks in Asia and the Paciﬁc
and illustrate the dynamics of the spillover effects of the ﬁnancial crisis into the re-
gion. Brownlees and Engle (2010) construct the Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES)
as a measure of the systemic risk of an individual ﬁnancial institution. The MES
of a ﬁnancial ﬁrm is based on market data and describes the expected loss of an
equity investor should the overall market decline substantially. It depends on the
volatility of a ﬁrm equity price and is determined by using advanced econometric
models. Acharya et al. (2010b) deﬁne the contribution of a ﬁnancial institution
to overall systemic risk as the institution’s systemic expected shortfall (SES). The
systemic expected shortfall of an institution increases with the leverage of this insti-
tution and with it’s MES. The authors demonstrate how SES can be used to predict
the outcome of stress tests, decline in equity valuations of large ﬁrms during the
ﬁnancial crisis and the increase in their CDS spreads. Both papers are the building
blocks of the NYU Stern systemic risk ranking4 that measures the systemic risk
contributions of the largest U.S. ﬁnancial institutions.
Integrated Measurements of Systemic Risk. Besides attributing systemic risk to
individual ﬁnancial institutions, it is also possible to derive measurements of overall
systemic risk in a ﬁnancial system. These approaches have in common, that they
use more than one indicator of systemic risk, typically based on market data (i.e.
CDS spreads) and network data (i.e. about the interbank network structure). Gau-
thier et al. (2010) compare different methods of attributing systemic importance to
individual institutions using data from the Canadian banking system. The authors
ﬁnd that macroprudential capital requirements can reduce the risk of a systemic cri-
sis by 25% and that the macroprudential capital requirements can differ from the
observed capital levels by up to 50%. This difference is furthermore not trivially
related to a bank’s size or it’s default probability. Schwaab et al. (2010) propose
an econometric framework for the measurement of global ﬁnancial and credit risk
conditions based on state space methods. Furthermore, they propose a coincident
indicator for unobserved default stress as a measure for overall ﬁnancial system risk.
They ﬁnd that credit risk conditions can signiﬁcantly and persistently decouple
from business cycle conditions due to e.g. unobserved changes in credit supply and
that such decoupling can be an early warning signal for macro-prudential policy.
Chan-Lau (2010) proposes to base additional capital charges for systemically impor-
tant ﬁnancial institutions on their incremental contribution to systemic risk. The
proposed framework to measure a ﬁnancial institution’s contribution to systemic
risk uses CoRisk, network analysis and one-factor credit risk portfolio models.
4http://www.systemicriskranking.stern.nyu.edu/
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Chan-Lau uses the expected societal loss as a proxy for the systemic importance of a
ﬁnancial institution. In contrast to Tarashev et al. (2009) and Gauthier et al. (2010),
Chan-Lau also factors in the increase in default risk of other institutions triggered
by the failure of one institution. Aikman et al. (2009) develop a model that uses
macro-credit risk, income risk, network interactions, feedback effects and funding
risk to assess the impact of macroeconomic and ﬁnancial shocks on the banking sys-
tem. Their “Risk Assessment Model for Systemic Institutions” (RAMSI) is based
on detailed balance sheet data and can be used to assess the impact on shocks on
individual ﬁnancial institutions and the ﬁnancial system as a whole. One particular
interesting point about the RAMSI model is, that it incorporates a mechanism to
model informational contagion. Three indicators, solvency concerns, liquidity po-
sition and conﬁdence are used to describe a bank’s ability to reﬁnance on funding
markets.
IV Policy Conclusions
A number of authors have critically analyzed the Basel III framework and pro-
posed regulatory reform measures. Hellwig (2010) argues that there exist a number
of asset correlations that went unnoticed prior to the crisis. Firstly, correlations
arising from a common dependence on underlying macroeconomic factors, i.e. of
credit risks in mortgages or mortgage-backed securities and other derivatives, were
underestimated. And secondly, correlations of risks via similiar contracts, such as
counterparty credit risks and underlying risks in derivatives, were insufﬁciently
taken into account. This underestimation of correlations has drastic consequences,
as banks were enabled by Basel II to conduct internal risk models in order to de-
termine the appropriate amount of risk. Hellwig, however, points out that the
empirical basis for this internal risk modelling is unsatisfactory: time series that are
being used are often very short and do not allow reliable estimations of the under-
lying process; credit risk events are very rare, which makes them hard to estimate;
these problems are ampliﬁed when it comes to the estimation of asset correlations.
He further argues that the model-based approach ampliﬁed the interconnectivity
in the ﬁnancial system and thus contributed to systemic risk. Hellwig (2010) pro-
poses two major changes to the system of banking regulation: (i) eliminate the
risk-calibration of regulatory capital; and (ii) substantially higher regulatory capi-
tal.
Rochet (2010) argues that the explicit bail-out guarantees that were issued by the
G20 to large ﬁnancial institutions erode market discipline and create moral hazard.
He further argues that the lack of resiliency of the interbank money market to
the relatively small shocks from the sub-prime mortgage market is a major chal-
lenge for banking supervisors as banks were, prior to the crisis, deemed to be very
resilient on the micro-level. The author emphasizes the major difﬁculties of identi-
fying ﬁnancial institutions that are too big to fail (TBTF) and would thus require
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additional supervisory oversight. The paper suggests to adopt central counterparty
clearing for all “vital” market infrastructures (i.e. interbank transactions and deriva-
tives) instead of opaque over-the-counter transactions. Furthermore, Rochet (2010)
proposes that ﬁnancial supervision should shift from protecting individual banks
to protecting “platforms” (i.e. interbank markets, money markets, some derivative
markets and large-value payment systems) and that the mandate of central banks
should be reﬁned accordingly.
Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson (2010) point out a number of shortcomings with
the Basel III framework, part of which are rooted in Basel II. They criticize that
promises in the ﬁnancial system are not treated equally, regardless of where they
are located. This allows for regulatory arbitrage. They further point out, that with
increasing regulation in the banking sector, more capital will be invested in the
unregulated shadow banking sector, as the cost of capital in the regulated sector in-
creases. Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson (2010) show that the Basel II risk-weighting
resulted in a “perverse outcome in the crisis” as banks with higher Tier 1 capital
prior to the crisis generated higher losses when crisis struck. As Basel III brings
only minor changes to the risk-weighting procedure, the danger of perverse incen-
tives still exists. The authors further argue that the risk-weighting approach might
not work well together with the leverage ratio. Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson
(2010) propose to apply a quadratic minimum capital penalty for deviations from a
benchmark portfolio in order to deal with lump-sum risks and argue that liquidity
management should best be left to the market, as the crisis was primarily a crisis of
solvency and conﬁdence.
IV.1 Shortcomings of the Existing Reform Proposal
While Basel III can be considered a necessary step forward, it has a number of
shortcomings with respect to the regulation of SIFIs and systemic risk. Stronger
capital requirements can help to enhance the resilience of the ﬁnancial system to
contagion effects, common shocks, and informational spillovers, as they effectively
reduce counterparty risk. In this respect, the increased core capital requirements,
as well as the increase in capital quality were steps in the right direction. This is
especially the case for the leverage ratio and liquidity requirements. A number of
problems remain, however.
(i) The core problem with capital requirements is their dependency on risk-
weighted assets. As long as the risk-weights for interbank loans and other ﬁ-
nancial assets do not reﬂect the true risk associated with these assets, even the
strongest capital requirements are rendered useless. In fact, the risk-weights
currently implemented largely contributed to the creation of systemic risk as
they incentivized banks to hold ﬁnancial assets (interbank loans, derivatives,
etc.) instead of real assets (corporate loans, corporate bonds, etc.) that have
Page 15
Working Papers on Global Financial Markets No. 17
lower correlation. Basel III has missed the opportunity to reform the risk
weights and rule them out as a source of systemic risk.
The asset value correlation (AVC) factor proposed for large ﬁnancial institu-
tions in Basel III is a global factor and does not take into account the different
magnitudes of correlation of different assets. The correlation between two as-
set classes (i.e. the correlation between corporate loans and interbank loans)
will in general be lower than the correlation of two assets of the same asset
class. Banks thus have no incentive to diversify their portfolios but will rather
specialize on holding assets of a certain class and gain proﬁts from economies
of scale and specialization, effectively creating portfolio lump risks. Portfolio
lumpiness, however, is a signiﬁcant source of systemic risk, as e.g. Georg and
Poschmann (2010) show.
Therefore, the risk-weights and asset value correlation factor of Basel III fail
to mitigate systemic risk. As banks lack the relevant information about the
network structure of the ﬁnancial system, they will necessarily underestimate
the correlation of their portfolios and are thus unable to conduct optimal
risk management. Only the supervisory authority is able to appropriately
map the ﬁnancial network in a macroprudential risk analysis. The network
effect is ampliﬁed for SIFIs as the correlations between interbank loans from
smaller banks to SIFIs will be larger, as it is the very deﬁnition of a SIFI that
its default causes widespread failure in the ﬁnancial system.
(ii) Basel III aims at regulating SIFIs by imposing additional capital requirements
that are deemed to be commensurate with their systemic importance. The
systemic importance of a bank, however, is a highly volatile quantity that can
rapidly change over time. As it is impossible for banks to raise banking capital
over night, they will be forced to hold as much banking capital as is required
at the time of their largest systemic importance for the capital requirement
to be effective. This argument makes it difﬁcult for regulatory authorities
to justify the additional requirements to the banks. Furthermore, capital re-
quirements to prevent banks from gaining systemic importance can only be
effective, if these requirements generate costs for the banks that are higher
than the beneﬁts from bail-out guarantees (see e.g. Akram and Christoph-
esen (2010) for an analysis of gains from systemic importance). Otherwise,
banks would still have an incentive to gain systemic importance. The bene-
ﬁts of bail-out guarantees can be estimated from two factors: (i) the amount
of money governments had to spend on recent bail-outs; and (ii) the im-
plicit gains that stem from the extraordinary monetary policy measures.5 It
seems therefore unlikely that imposing additional capital requirements for
SIFIs works in practice. This raises the question of what is left of the promise
5One example would be that banks were able to use the extended collateral standards of central
banks and obtain central bank liquidity at a rate of 1% by depositing e.g. Greek sovereign bonds
that pay a much higher interest.
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to regulate banks that are too large, too interconnected, or otherwise of sys-
temic importance. Basel III fails to provide a valid answer to that question.
(iii) Another problem with imposing additional capital requirements for SIFIs is,
that the G20 yet failed to agree on a global lower bound of these require-
ments. This will lead to a race to the bottom amongst countries, as no coun-
try will voluntarily weaken it’s ﬁnancial sector by imposing large capital re-
quirements for systemically important ﬁnancial institutions. I have argued
that it is very difﬁcult to properly measure the systemic importance of an
individual ﬁnancial institution and regulatory authorities will always have
to justify additional capital requirements for those banks that they deem to
be of systemic importance. Without the appropriate measures of individual
ﬁnancial institutions, it is almost impossible for a regulatory authority to
justify any additional capital charges of signiﬁcant order. The Financial Sta-
bility Board (2010a) addresses the same problem with respect to the require-
ment that supervisory authorities be pro-active and intervene early during
the build-up of systemic risks. It is stated that “when supervisors take an early
intervention approach, there are often no tangible risk indicators (i.e. losses) to
conﬁrm that this intervention is needed, so this makes it difﬁcult to convince a
ﬁrm and their boards that such measures are necessary to deal proactively with
emerging areas of risk within a SIFI”. The key question is, if it is generally pos-
sible to construct measures that detect systemic risks while they are building
up. While the indicators currently available in the literature are a huge step
forward when compared to the literature before the crisis, they might still
fail this particular task.
(iv) The different forms of systemic risk are interdependent and reinforce each
other. However, informational spillovers are a rarely addressed issue in the
G20 discussion on systemic risk. One of the few places where informational
spillovers are mentioned is the Financial Stability Board (2010a), stating that
“Having a capital level that is too low vis-a-vis the risks being taken, especially for
SIFIs, can lead to a highly vulnerable ﬁnancial system. This shortfall contributed
to the loss of conﬁdence among counterparties, funds providers and investors”.
The enhanced capital requirements of Basel III will reduce the default proba-
bility of ﬁnancial institutions. Therefore it will also reduce the risk of infor-
mational spillovers and herding behaviour, as market participants are aware
of the higher resilience of the ﬁnancial system. This will strengthen the trust
amongst banks, but the question remains if it will prevent liquidity hoarding
and ﬁre-sales in a future crisis. The recent experience suggests that banks are
well aware of the shortcomings of their risk-assessment and the devastating
effects of informational contagion. This manifested with the insolvency of
Lehman brothers in September 2008. The systemic impact of this particular
insolvency was modest in terms of contagion effects and common shocks.
But it was a signal to the remaining banks that they had underestimated the
risks they had taken in their asset portfolios. The regulatory reform process
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thus has to focus on addressing informational spillovers as a relevant form of
systemic risk and propose measures to address this issue.6
IV.2 A Way Forward for Systemic Risk Regulation
The aforementioned shortcomings have to be addressed in the regulatory reform
process in order to effectively regulate systemic risk. Some authors have made pro-
posals about how the way forward with systemic risk regulation could look like.
Rochet (2010) proposes a rather radical approach and suggests that ﬁnancial super-
vision should shift from protecting banks to protecting what he calls “platforms”.
These platforms are markets, such as the interbank market, money markets, some
derivative markets, but also large value payment systems. This approach is appeal-
ing, but might be of purely academic interest, as it would require a completely
different ﬁnancial architecture, and as the author suggests himself, a new mandate
for central banks and regulatory authorities. Hellwig (2010) proposes to eliminate
the risk-calibration of regulatory capital altogether and a substantial increase in re-
quired capital. This would solve all problems with the current risk-weights, but
does not seem to be a realistic solution as banks will lobby hard to prevent such an
“thorough overhaul” of the ﬁnancial system. Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson (2010)
propose to apply a quadratic minimum capital penalty for deviations from a bench-
mark portfolio in order to deal with lump-sum risks. This proposal is appealing for
two reasons: it would solve the lumpiness-problem of Basel II (and Basel III) and
is more realistic than the rather radical approaches of Rochet (2010) and Hellwig
(2010).
While acknowleding that the crisis calls for a much more fundamental reform of
the ﬁnancial system than currently provided by Basel III, this paper tries to outline
a realistic and viable way forward for systemic risk regulation. In order to address
the identiﬁed shortcomings of Basel III, this paper proposes three measures.
(i) Risk-weights for interbank loans have to reﬂect the knife-edge property of
interbank markets in some way. In normal times the low risk-weights for in-
terbank loans are justiﬁed by the mutual insurance aspect of interbank mar-
kets. In times of crisis, however, interbank loans will amplify systemic risk
and their respective risk-weights should be much larger. Thus, the static risk-
weights as currently implemented in Basel III exhibit a pro-cyclicality with
respect to systemic risk and a counter-cyclical risk buffer should be put in
place. While Basel III proposed a counter-cyclical capital buffer, this is imple-
mented as a global factor and does not change the incentive structure of the
risk-weights. The effect of a counter-cyclical capital buffer could be realized
6An interesting remark is made by Haldane and May (2011) who argue that liquidity ratios will
effectively limit liquidity hoarding shocks. While their point is arguably true, Acharya and Yorul-
mazer (2008) show that informational spillovers also increase the endogenous correlation of banks’
assets.
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by allowing national authorities to implement it as a counter-cyclical buffer
on the risk-weights. Such a counter-cyclical risk-weight would counteract the
time-dimension of systemic risk.
(ii) To enhance the risk-management capabilities of banks, the asset value cor-
relation multiplier should be dynamic. Banks should be given a set of dy-
namic AVC for all asset classes (including cross sections) and then calculate
their individual multiplier. This would enable banks to enhance their risk
management and set an incentive for portfolio diversiﬁcation. An additional
advantage of such a dynamic multiplier is that it can be used as an effective
regulatory tool in times of low economic growth but increasing systemic
risk. In such times there will be a lot of political pressure on central banks
to take measures stimulating growth. Even though most central banks are
independent, a dynamic AVC would be a much more ﬁne-tuned tool than
just increasing the counter-cyclical buffer or imposing additional capital re-
quirements on SIFIs. A further argument for the introduction of a dynamic
multiplier is that the correlation of assets captures the cross-sectional dimen-
sion of systemic risk, and should thus be regulated accordingly. This line of
argument is the rationale to distinguish between counter-cyclical risk-weights
and a dynamic AVC multiplier as regulatory measures.
(iii) Basel III does not provide adequate measures to regulate systemically impor-
tant ﬁnancial institutions. This is a particular shortcoming and should be
addressed in future regulation proposals. Instead of focussing on capital re-
quirements, this paper proposes to focus on market transparency. I have
argued above why informational spillovers played an important role in the
recent ﬁnancial crisis and that Basel III does not take this source of systemic
risk into account. While increased capital buffers can help strengthen the
trust amongst market participants, they are not sufﬁcient to counteract the
herding behaviour that was seen during the current crisis. In order to coun-
teract informational spillovers, asymmetric information between market par-
ticipants has to be reduced. It is thus necessary to emphasize the third pillar of
Basel III and to enhance market transparency considerably. Especially banks
that are considered to be of systemic importance should be required to pub-
lish more frequently more detailed information. A practical way to achieve
this goal would be to introduce three categories of systemic importance, low,
medium and high. This simple scheme would account for the high volatility
of systemic importance. Banks that have a high systemic importance only a
limited amount of time are considered to be of medium systemic importance
while those who are almost always of high systemic importance are in the
high group and the rest is in the low group.7 Due to the enhanced reporting
and data publication requirements for systemically important ﬁnancial insti-
7One could envisage a rule that each bank will be put into the next higher (lower) peer group if it
has a higher (lower) ranking for two consecutive time periods. This would reduce the number of
up- and downgrades and still detect structural changes when systemic risks are building up.
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tutions there is no use in keeping the names of the SIFIs secret. All market
participants are aware who has which level of systemic importance and they
are aware that this level might change over time. The regulators could pub-
lish a quarterly update on the systemic risk ranking. This time interval is
frequent enough in order for banks to react to it and timely enough in order
to detect the emergence of lump systemic risk at a given ﬁnancial institution.
Such a simple scheme would allow different countries to use different mea-
sures of sytemic importance in order to take the country-speciﬁc details of
their banking system into account. For banks that are of global systemic
importance there should be an internationally agreed upon minimum re-
quirement for reporting and data publication. In order for such a regulation
scheme to be effective, it is necessary to have a transparent communication
what criteria are taken into account when the systemic importance of an in-
dividual ﬁnancial institution is measured. Note that this does not give rise
to moral hazard, as each bank only knows its local properties but cannot say
with certainty how the rest of the banking system evolves. Even if banks
decide to gain systemic importance (i.e. if they want to beneﬁt from implicit
bail-out guarantees) they cannot be sure that other banks do not behave sim-
ilar. Therefore all measures of systemic importance have to be relative mea-
sures in the sense that they measure the relative systemic importance of a
bank with respect to other banks.
The approach of enforcing additional reporting and data publication of SIFIs
(or those who are suspected to be SIFIs) is a much weaker approach than
requiring banks to hold additional capital. As I have argued above, it takes
banks some time to acquire new capital, especially in times when they most
need it. Therefore additional measures have to be taken to prevent banks
from trying to gain systemic importance. It is safe to assume that a bank with
high systemic importance index over a long period of time is considered to be
relevant for the system stability by other market participants. An insolvency
of such a bank will thus give rise to considerable informational spillovers
which are almost impossible to predict. Therefore, these banks are subject
to implicit bail-out guarantees which should not come without a price. This
price will not be imposed on the bank by other market participants. The
systemic importance of a bank does not relate to its probability of default,
which is the ultimate driver of reﬁnancing costs for the bank. Therefore, it
might prove useful to impose a levy or tax on systemic importance in order
to set the appropriate incentives.
The proposed policy measures only sketch a way forward for systemic risk regu-
lation. Some parts of the picture are still missing, as the regulation of the large
shadow bank sector has not yet been discussed in detail. The measures aim to be
realistic in the sense that they do not call for a complete overhaul of ﬁnancial regu-
lation, but rather try to improve the steps along the way that are already taken.
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